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THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Priority No. 2

MARVIN JEAN JACQUES,
D efendan t/App e11ant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for uttering a forged
prescription, a thii: d degree felony, ii 1 violation 01 Ucah Code
AnTlt

§ 58-37-8(4) (a) (iii) (Supp. 1995) .

This Court has

jurisdiction, over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
i
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expert witness whose familiarity w;*\ defendant's handwriting was
not a c q u i s - -or purposes of

__

.ligation could authenticate

defendant's handwriting pursuant to 4-ujLe
Evidence?

:

The trial court's determination of whether a witness is
qualified to testify under rule 901(b)(2) presents a legal
question.

Nonetheless, in reviewing this question, the appellate

court should grant the trial court a considerable "measure of
discretion" because of the highly fact-dependent nature of the
determination.
2.

State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 (Utah 1994).

Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's

verdict?
A criminal conviction based on a jury verdict will be
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is "so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 'reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant
committed the crime."

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah

1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
Utah Rule of Evidence 901, governing the requirement of
authentication or identification, provides in pertinent part:
(a) General provision. The requirement of
authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what
its proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration
only, and not by way of limitation, the
2

following are examples of authentication or
identification conforming with the
requirements of this rule:
(2) Nonexpert opinion on
handwriting • Nonexper*- opinion as
to the genuineness of handwriting,
based upon familiarity not acquired
for purposes of the litigation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with one count of
uttering a forged prescription, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(4) (a) (iii) (Supp. 1995) (R. 239). After prevailing on a
motion to suppress the eyewitness identification testimony of
three witnesses, defendant, acting pro se, was tried before a
jury and convicted as charged (R. 304-05).

He then filed this

timely appeal (R. 311).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On September 27, 1994, a black man entered the Art City
Pharmacy in Springville and presented a prescription to be filled
for "James Brooks" for "Percoceth," signed by "Dr. Darrel Olsen"
(Tr. of 3/14/95 at 29, 42, 44; addendum A).

Employee Vallorie

Seitz, suspicious of the misspelling of the drug Percocet,
alerted the pharmacist, who apparently called the police (Tr. 4445).

Before the police arrived, however, the man left the

pharmacy.
3

According to another pharmacy employee, the man drove off in
a small, compact, cherry red sports car (Tr. 49). The employee,
presented at trial with two photos of a red Mazda MX-3 sports car
owned by defendant, agreed that the photos were consistent with
the vehicle he had observed driving away from the pharmacy (Tr.
51, 53) .
Dr. Darrel Olsen, whose signature appeared on the
prescription, did not sign the prescription, nor had he
authorized anyone else to do so for him (Tr. 29). Dr. Olsen
noted that prescription forms were routinely left in examination
rooms in the clinics where he practiced, and that patients were
often left unsupervised in those rooms (Tr. 32).
Dr. Kim Bateman, Olsen's partner, corroborated that the
prescription forms were readily accessible to patients. Dr.
Bateman had seen defendant as a patient on September 26, 1994,
the day before the forged prescription was tendered at Art City
Pharmacy (Tr. 70, 72). Prior to being examined by Dr. Bateman,
defendant was left unsupervised in an examination room (Tr. 73).
Although defendant did not testify, he produced a writing
sample under court order in the presence of a law enforcement
officer (Tr. 54, 65, 66; addendum B).

The State contended that

defendant had tried to disguise his normal handwriting in the
4

sample and so produced a witness to authenticate other documents
in defendant's handwriting for purposes of comparison with the
Percocet prescription (Tr. 85, 94-95; addendum C).
Sherry Ragan, a deputy Utah County attorney, initially
testified outside the presence of the jury.1

She had become

familiar with defendant's handwriting, both from letters he had
written to her and from pro se motions he had filed in the course
of previous litigation (Tr. 80-81).
Ragan first authenticated a letter defendant had written to
her, observing that she had received it from defendant and that
the content as well as the handwriting indicated that it was from
him (Tr. 78, 81-82).

Ragan then examined a letter written to

David Cole, prosecutor in this case, and an envelope, also
addressed to Cole.

She recognized the handwriting on both

documents as defendant's (Tr. 82-83).

She also authenticated

several other handwritten court documents filed by defendant (Tr.
83-84) .

1

Defendant objected to her testimony as prejudicial,
arguing that a jury was likely to infer past criminal behavior
from the fact of his correspondence with a prosecutor.
Accordingly, the trial court recessed the jury prior to hearing
from Ragan. The court explained that it could thus consider the
admissibility of Ragan's testimony as a matter of law under rule
901 without risking prejudice to defendant (Tr. 78).
5

The trial court then ruled: "Under rule 901, Ms. Ragan is a
competent lay person who can give a non-expert opinion of
handwriting7' (Tr. 91) . The court supported its ruling with oral
findings of fact:
I find that the circumstances which guarantee
trustworthiness that these were written by
you, the fact that they purported to give a
recitation of events that occurred and came
from an address that you were currently
residing in, and that you addressed them to
the court in some instances while
representing yourself, and filed them with
the court, then [sic] came from the address
of the defendant, I think that it is
reasonable that the circumstances of
trustworthiness and circumstances guarantee
that these are reasonably calculated to be
trustworthy evidences of the defendant's
handwriting. And so I will receive them.
(Tr. 95).2
The jury returned to the courtroom, and the State called its
handwriting expert.

The expert explained that 10-20 "points of

identification" between a questioned handwriting sample and a
sample known to be written by a particular individual were

2

The court explained to defendant that because it had
determined as a matter of law that the authenticated documents
were written by defendant, there would be no need to call Ragan
as a witness before the jury unless defendant questioned the
validity of the authentication by denying that he wrote the
documents (Tr. 103-07). Defendant subsequently raised the issue,
and Ragan, identified before the jury only as a "local attorney,"
testified briefly (Tr. 150-56).
6

necessary to establish a "highly probable or positive"
identification that the two samples were written by the same
person (Tr. 116). Because the three documents Ragan
authenticated as written by defendant had 32 points of
identification with the forged prescription, the expert concluded
that they were positively written by the same hand (Tr. 131).
As to defendant's court-ordered writing sample, the expert
observed, "I could tell there were definitely some capricious
changes made.

In other words, someone was fooling around with

their slant and the way that they made things" (Tr. 133).
Nonetheless, he stated, "We still leave things behind.

We still

leave points. And in going through it, I came up with -- I think
it was around 18 to 2 0 points that I knew I had from this" (Tr.
133).

He concluded that there was no question in his mind that

the court-ordered sample and the forged prescription were written
by the same person (Tr. 134, 148).3
3

The handwriting expert's detailed analysis before the
jury focused on the three documents authenticated by Ragan rather
than on the court-ordered sample. The expert stated that with
all of the capricious changes in the court-ordered sample, it was
easier to explain his technical analysis to lay persons using
samples of "natural handwriting" (Tr. 134). His choice of
comparison documents, however, did not detract from his
unequivocal conclusion that the court-ordered sample was written
by the same person who wrote the Percocet prescription (Tr. 134,
148) .
7

Based on this evidence, the jury found defendant guilty, as
charged, of uttering a forged prescription (R. 270).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by allowing a
non-expert witness to authenticate documents pursuant to rule
901(b)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence, because: 1) the witness never
personally observed defendant write; 2) some of her familiarity
the defendant's writing was acquired for purposes of this
litigation; and 3) receipt of more than one letter is necessary
to establish familiarity under the rule.
First, neither rule nor case law requires personal
observation as a condition precedent to admitting testimony about
the genuineness of handwriting.

All that is required is

"evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims." Utah R. Evid. 901(1).
Second, the witness' familiarity was not acquired for
purposes of this litigation.

Defendant is confusing the

witness's familiarity with defendant's handwriting gained from
her past dealings with him in the course of other litigation with
her authentication of documents that he wrote in the course of
this litigation.

Plainly, the witness was already familiar with

defendant's handwriting when she authenticated the documents
8

related to this case.
Third, the degree of familiarity the witness has with
defendant's handwriting goes to the weight of the evidence, not
to its admissibility.

All that is required for admissibility is

familiarity sufficient to support a finding that the evidence is
what the witness claims it is. Once the trial court makes the
initial legal determination, it is the jury's job to weigh the
evidence and assess its credibility.
Defendant also contends that the evidence was insufficient
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the person who
uttered the forged prescription.

In essence, he complains that

there was no direct evidence of his guilt.

What he has ignored,

however, are the many reasonable inferences that the jury could
have drawn from the evidence before it. When the evidence and
the inferences are considered, the evidence is not so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable as to necessarily have
created reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime.

9

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT A
NON-EXPERT WITNESS, FAMILIAR WITH DEFENDANT'S
HANDWRITING FOR PURPOSES OTHER THAN THIS
LITIGATION, COULD AUTHENTICATE CERTAIN
DOCUMENTS PURSUANT TO RULE 901(b)(2), UTAH
RULES OF EVIDENCE
The gist of defendant's argument is that the trial court
erred by allowing Sherry Ragan to testify as a non-expert witness
because: 1) she had never personally seen defendant write; 2)
some of her familiarity with defendant's writing was acquired for
purposes of this litigation; and 3) receipt of more than one
letter is necessary in order to establish familiarity with
handwriting (Br. of App. at 13-14).

To support these claims,

defendant relies on rule 901(b)(2) and on State v. Freshwater, 85
P. 447 (Utah 1906).
Defendant's first assertion, that a witness must personally
see an individual execute at least one writing in order to later
authenticate another document, is unsupported by either
Freshwater or rule 901.
rule

Freshwater stands for the "well-settled"

"that writing may be proved by evidence of a witness who

has seen the person write."
added).

Freshwater, 85 P. at 448 (emphasis

That is, seeing a person write is one way of

10

establishing a degree of familiarity with that individual's
handwriting sufficient to allow the authenticating witness's
testimony to go to the jury.

See E. Cleary, McCormick on

Evidence §221, at 41 (4th ed. 1992)("Adequate familiarity may be
present if the witness has seen the person write, or if he has
seen writings purporting

to be those of the person in question

under circumstances indicating their genuineness").

Nowhere in

Freshwater does the court require personal observation of
handwriting as a condition precedent to testifying about the
genuineness of handwriting.
Nor does rule 901 contemplate the requirement of personal
observation.

See, e.g.. State v. Alson. 461 S.E.2d 687, 704

(N.C. 1995); People v. Williams. 653 N.E.2d 899, 906 (111. App.
Ct. 1995); Mackey v. Irisari. 445 S.E.2d 742, 753 (W.Va. 1994).
Indeed, all rule 901 requires is "evidence sufficient to support
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent
claims."

Utah R. Evid. 901(a).4

particularly high hurdle."

"The rule does not erect a

United States v. Ortiz. 966 F.2d 707,

716 ((1st Cir. 1992), cert, denied. 506 U.S. 1063 (1993).
Certainly, if the framers of the rule had intended a requirement

4

Utah's rule 901 is the same as rule 901, Federal Rules of
Evidence, from which it was plainly derived.
11

of personal observation, they would have explicitly included that
either in the basic rule or in the illustrative examples.
Second, defendant claims that Sherry Ragan's familiarity
with two of the three documents analyzed by the handwriting
expert was acquired for purposes of this litigation.

Therefore,

he argues, because rule 901(b)(2) requires familiarity "not
acquired for purposes of the litigation," the trial court erred
in allowing Ragan to testify (Br. of App. at 14).
Ragan's familiarity with defendant's handwriting, however,
was not acquired for purposes of this litigation.

To the

contrary, she acquired her familiarity with his handwriting over
the course of two prosecutions that occurred sometime during the
six or seven years preceding this litigation (Tr. 80-82).

The

two documents to which defendant objects, which were written by
defendant to the prosecutor in this case, were not the basis for
her familiarity.

Rather, she was authenticating that defendant

wrote them, based on her familiarity with his handwriting gained
during prior prosecutions.

Plainly, Ragan was already familiar

with defendant's handwriting when she was asked to authenticate
documents related to this case.

Cf. People v. Cepeda. 851 F.2d

1564, 1566-67 (9th Cir. 1988)(witness' familiarity with
handwriting gained only after defendant indicted and for sole
12

purpose of testifying at trial constituted a "clear violation" of
rule 901(b) (2)) .
Even assuming arguendo that defendant's second argument had
merit, his third contention -- that Ragan's familiarity with the
remaining document is insufficient to allow her to authenticate
the handwriting -- would fail.

Without any analysis, defendant

baldly asserts that "familiarity with one letter is insufficient
under Freshwater and Rule 901 to render [Ragan] competent to
render nonexpert opinion. . .." (Br. of App. at 14).
Defendant's lack of any legal analysis is in itself a sufficient
ground for refusing to consider this claim.

State v. Amicone,

689 P,2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
But, even on the merits, Freshwatex does not support
defendant's interpretation of rule 901.

In Freshwater, the court

determined the threshold legal question of admissibility by
holding that a witness who claimed to have seen defendant write
once could testify that the letter she received was in his
handwriting.

The testimony then went to the jury, which was

responsible for determining how much weight the testimony should
be given and how much credibility to accord the witness, given
the fact that the witness had seen defendant write only once.
Freshwater, 85 P. at 448.
13

Thus, defendant's claim fails on the merits because he
confuses the threshold issue of admissibility with the weight to
be accorded evidence once the court has admitted it.

See United

States v. Binzel. 907 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1990)(citing Rinker
v. United States. 151 F. 755 (8th Cir. 1907))(noting that once a
"minimal factual basis'' for familiarity is presented, "the extent
of the familiarity generally goes to the weight to be accorded
the testimony, rather than to its admissibility"). All that is
required for admissibility is familiarity sufficient to support a
finding that the evidence is what the witness claims it to be.
State v. Purcell. 711 P.2d 243, 245 (Utah 1985).

"The rule

requires only that the court admit evidence if sufficient proof
has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in
favor of authenticity or identification.

The rest is up to the

jury." 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's
Evidence § 901(a) [01] at 901-19 (1994).

That is, once the court

admits the evidence, it is the jury's job to weigh that evidence
and determine its credibility.

Thus, in this case, the number of

documents that Ragan authenticated would go to the weight of the
evidence, not to its admissibility.
In this case, the trial court correctly interpreted and
applied rule 901(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
14

In

addition, the court's findings underlying its legal determination
are well-supported by the record evidence.5

For these reasons,

the trial court's decision to allow Sherry Ragan to testify as a
non-expert witness whose familiarity with defendant's handwriting
was not acquired for purposes of this litigation should remain
undisturbed.
POINT TWQ
THE EVIDENCE AND INFERENCES THAT MAY
REASONABLY BE DRAWN FROM IT AMPLY SUPPORT THE
JURY'S VERDICT THAT DEFENDANT WAS THE
INDIVIDUAL WHO UTTERED THE FORGED
PRESCRIPTION
Defendant asserts that the evidence was legally insufficient
to convict him of uttering a forged prescription.

Specifically,

he argues that the State "failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was the person who did make or utter a forged
prescription" (Br. of App. at 17-18).
In order to reverse a criminal conviction based on a jury
verdict for insufficient evidence, this Court must determine that

5

Even if the trial court erred in allowing Ragan to
authenticate the documents, the error was harmless. See, e.g.
State v. Purcell. 711 P.2d at 244-45; Utah R. Evid. 103(a). The
handwriting expert compared the Percocet prescription not only to
the authenticated documents to which defendant objected, but also
to the disguised court-ordered sample, concluding that the courtordered sample was positively written by the same hand as the
forged prescription (Tr. at 134, 148) .
15

the evidence was xvso inconclusive or so inherently improbable
that 'reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt'
that the defendant committed the crime."

State v. Goddard. 871

P.2d at 543.
Defendant cites three facts that he believes must
necessarily have created a reasonable doubt that defendant was
the person who uttered the check: first, that Dr. Kim Bateman,
who provided the only direct identification of defendant,
identified him merely as a patient he had seen on September 26,
1994; second, that two pharmacy employees who saw the person in
the pharmacy (one of whom also saw him drive off in a red sports
car) only identified him as a ublack man"; and, third, that no
one saw defendant take a prescription pad from a clinic (Br. of
App. at 18). 6
In essence, defendant's argument is that there was no direct
proof that defendant was the person who took the prescription
form and later uttered the forged prescription.
6

Direct proof,

In addition, with no authority whatsoever and directly
contrary to the expert's record testimony, defendant asserts that
the expert's "testimony that the prescription and the handwriting
sample had 18-20 points of common identity is insufficient to
establish identification" (Br. of App. at 18). Plainly, this
Court need not even consider statements unsupported by either law
and fact. State v. Pascoe, 774 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah App. 1989).

16

however, is not necessary to convict an individual of a crime.
The law is well-settled that "circumstantial evidence alone may
be competent to establish the guilt of the accused." State v.
Tanner, 675 P.2d 539, 550 (Utah 1983), superseded on other
grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).
In this case, there was overwhelming evidence from which a
jury could reasonably infer that defendant was the person who
uttered the forged prescription.
4/1/95 at 39-45).

See Sentencing Hearing of

The State presented evidence that prescription

pads were routinely left in clinic examination rooms, that a
clinic doctor examined defendant in one of these rooms the day
before the prescription was tendered, that defendant was left
unattended in the room prior to the examination, and that the
doctor whose signature appeared on the prescription never signed
or authorized anyone else to sign the prescription for him (Tr.
29, 32, 69, 70, 72, 73). A reasonable inference from this
sequence of facts is that defendant had the opportunity to take a
blank prescription form from the room.
Two pharmacy employees testified at trial that a black man
tendered the forged prescription at the pharmacy (Tr. 44, 49).
One employee testified that he saw the same man drive off in a
compact, cherry red sports car that resembled photos of the
17

compact, cherry red sports car owned by defendant (Tr. 49-50).

A

reasonable inference from this testimony is that defendant may
have been the individual who tendered the prescription.
A handwriting expert compared in detail the forged
prescription with letters and an envelope written by defendant,
finding 32 distinct handwriting "points of identification" in the
forged prescription which were also present in the other
documents (Tr. 124, 131). He testified that 10-20 points of
identification were needed for a highly probable or positive
identification, and positively stated that defendant wrote the
prescription (Tr. 116-17) .
The expert also reviewed the court-ordered sample produced
by defendant prior to trial. He testified that although
defendant had tried to falsify and disguise his handwriting in
the sample, he was still able to locate 18-20 points of
identification that matched the forged prescription (Tr. 133).
Based on this analysis, he again opined that defendant wrote the
prescription (Tr. 134).
Under the circumstances, the facts upon which defendant
relies for his assertion that reasonable doubt must have existed
-- facts which the State does not dispute -- are simply
insufficient to create the level of improbability necessary to
18

reverse a jury verdict.

Indeed, in combination with other the

other facts cited, they are incriminating.

The single fact that

no one saw defendant actually take the prescription form does not
create reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming
circumstantial evidence against defendant.

In light of the

appellate court policy affording "great deference" to jury
verdicts, where, as here, there is "any evidence, including
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it," to support the
jury's verdict, this Court's inquiry should end and the verdict
should be affirmed.

State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d at 543.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction for uttering a forged prescription.
ORAL ARQUMENX
The State does not request oral argument in this case.
However, because of the paucity of state case law dealing with
handwriting authenticated pursuant to rule 901(b)(2), a full
written opinion would be helpful.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this o?*? day of February, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
19
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County Public Defenders Assoc, 40 South 100 West, Suite 200,
Provo, Utah 84601, this d^\ day of February, 1996.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Forged P r e s c r i p t i o n

nm SANPETE VALLEY HOSPITAL and MEDICAL CLINICS
Robert D. Armstong, M.D.
DEA No. AA2726365

Jan C. Jonsofi, PA-C
RiysiaaDu^sggtant - Certified

Kim A Bateman, M.D.
DEA No. AB6656409

Bruce Burnham, M.D.
DEA No. AB7577844

Darrel Oisen, M.D>

Gene £. Speakman, M.D.
DEA No. AS1639826

So. B02467947

Age
Mariti Family Clinic
159 North Main
Manrt, UT 84642
835-9231
£ p h r a i m M e d i c a l Clinic
99 South Main
Ephraim, UT 84627
283-4076
M o r o n i M e d i c a l Clinic
394 East 100 South
Moroni, UT 84646
436-8271

Address

2<ror

3r*is 9Q»K*>

<?5 / 0^-6 « /fa*/

Mt. P l e a s a n t Family
Health Center
1100 South Medical Drive
Mt Pleasant, UT 84647
462-3471

M.D
Dispense as written

Refill.

.times PRN NR

ADDENDUM B
C o u r t - o r d e r e d Handwriting Sample

Springville Police Dept.

>-l<

Springville, Utah
HANDWRITING SPECIMEN
Case No.

^Time"

JtfCQ U£

r-JgflN

Office

S t m t Address

JkW

^Ake'

\~~Arthur Bob Charles

State

City

k| Don
v TEdward
U n rFrank
^V.C^KUBS

Place of Birth
Date of Birth

A9«

^c^xA^^^^vWL

51

2C0

Color of Hair

Color of Eyes

| George Henry Imig

Build

Weight

Height

Rignt or Left Handed
1 John Kenneth Lamb

&%)U)N

\

Piece of Employ m e n t (or last employme h t )

L W ^ Y ^ ^ ^
Occupation or Trade

1 Mary Nan Olson

Social Security No.

IV0M2

Name of Neares t Reative

Relation

M
MLA W ^
Paul Queniin Robert

Address

A

0 C
B

Samuel Tom Umphrey

K

L

u

v

D

M

N

a

b

k

1

U

V

E

0
O

1/
Y

,....dd

C

ftu~fc~
m

n

e

M

XU/ltv,

G

.P....A
P

Q

T

5
R

Vernon Will Xavier

J

H

\

Yolanda Ziffman

T

S

W

X

3

1

3

4

1234 N. East Ave., S.W.

Z

c

3

V>

f

9

h

o
o

....<L
p

q

r

\ 5678
^ VS. West
\ £-£cft
f\.\i £ SNA
Blvd., N.W.

J

\
I

J

s
s

9012 E. North PI., S.E.

t

2.

J...A..

2

F

4-

V

_A___i>

j

\

C

K L.

1

(V-~D^

k^u\_(>Tv^rx\^ ^r^£c<er

W R I T E - DO NOT 19 R I N T - C A P I T A L A N C ) S M A L L LETTERS

A

\_iWs\Q

y

5

3456 W. South St., N.E.

z

^

.J*6

7

3

<\

e

9

\

\0
10

|

'jK'.fMg,
^

7,

The above is a specimen of my handwriting prepared freely e*d voluntarily.
Date

Witnessed by

Signature

/

\§=J*5 n
J

~~ Dale^itnessed

V»

Exemplars of (Print Name, First, Initial)

*

Year Born

Race

Sex

Springville Police Dept.
Springville, Utah

page 2

HANDWRITING SPECIMEN
THE MONTHS OF THE YEAR

January

,W\KV3A

February

fecsCOfrfro

May

V

V

September^S^iiS^S^S-

octob^3Si£^2=__

June

^c

MarchJMv^
April

fy/W

Julyc\'V-M

V

Auouat K v H > \ > S X

/\<XNV-

December

i

t

C

x

I

l

^

WRITE THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS
4679

4321

S\ —, £_
8675_ikjJ_Q

8237 "A^VA

7197.

8076.

7\c\n

^AU

^VV\

0010WV^ \ * ^

8453.

Q\\<^

5583.

5814

*5^M

1585

5^1^
<.o

V=rA b

SPELL OUT THE FOLLOWING NUMBERS
One.

t^v^.
*

Two
Three

v

,\^
v x*~~- ~-'"

Four

Seven >-/'— X ' T ^-V'

Sixty

Eight ^ L ^ ^ A .

Fifteen

N i n e ^ V v ^ ^ _

Twenty

T e n 3 ^ ^ _

Thirtftftn \ V \ \ ^ J A \ - <r. v ^-

^-V^\ ^-\U
TwelveX^r-L_\ V

F o r t y ^ ^ S ^ L

Eleven 2
<=^ \
Six.

V\v
\

-V

o

Thirty.

• > ,

r\U^
"\V^c\V^

'N\\^\\^\\c^
_^_

^

fe^c.Xo^
Signature

Vw. VtK/,/^^-\P'^fo

s

lessed by
Witnessed
OSf* Wltncsxo

J^_

\

^

^

ADDENDUM C
A u t h e n t i c a t e d Documents

Y fhl7>e /r

,M *-

' r ^m Dfivk) c*t€

ft CetnCfit- T/M£
,„l

FficTtL.
ll„U,,l,ll„ll„„IU.II.H.II,M,M„IUII,n!nM

1

"'

#

~7n 2)£f cny drro/evzy Cat/Any 2MI//2> ^O

you( 7frgrC//OLun: couttr 7ZAA)s&e/pF OF TH^ Dm

jLMyzgZsrnvzf 7W/rr7H&Cd7&f£rtX/<rr /lc~£itMu£/n&s
Ak&MtofilABLG' 2>£F&d&£ 6Jrra THE'Cou€irTZ*ts!SC
J)z£^£ki£fac

CL.

^-^-fy

